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CHIEF JUSTICE TOAL: Richard Bill Niles, Jr. was convicted of murder, 
armed robbery, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent 
crime. The court of appeals reversed Respondent's murder conviction and 
remanded for a new trial, finding the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury 
on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. State v. Niles, 400 S.C. 
527, 735 S.E.2d 240 (Ct. App. 2012).1  We reverse. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case arises from the shooting death of James Salter (the victim) in a 
Best Buy parking lot in Myrtle Beach.  It is undisputed that Niles, his fiancé, 
Mokeia Hammond, and Ervin Moore met the victim at the parking lot to purchase 
marijuana from him.2  Niles and Moore testified at trial,3 and Niles's version of 
events matched Moore's version, except as to whose idea it was to rob the victim 
and whether Niles or the victim fired the first shots.4  Thus, the evidence at trial 
focused on whether Niles was the aggressor in the deadly encounter.
On the afternoon of April 9, 2007, Niles and Hammond encountered Moore 
at a convenience store in Trio, South Carolina, and invited Moore to accompany 
them to Myrtle Beach.  Niles and Moore were acquaintances, having known each 
other through various family members.  On the way to Myrtle Beach, the trio 
smoked all of the marijuana that they had brought with them.  
1 Niles did not appeal his convictions for the remaining offenses.  Niles, 400 S.C. at 
531 n.1, 735 S.E.2d at 242 n.1. 
2 Hammond and Moore were also charged with murder, armed robbery, and 
possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. Moore entered 
into a plea agreement with the State, whereby he pleaded guilty to voluntary 
manslaughter, armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission 
of a violent crime in exchange for his testimony against Niles and Hammond at 
their joint trial. 
3 Hammond chose not to testify in her defense. 
4 Niles admitted he shot the victim and that Moore and Hammond were unarmed. 
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Therefore, Niles contacted the victim5 via telephone and arranged to meet 
him at the Best Buy parking lot to purchase marijuana.  Niles testified that his 
conversation with the victim had a dual purpose.  Not only was he meeting with 
the victim so that Moore could purchase a pound of marijuana from him, but he 
claimed that the victim owed him $5,000 as payment for other drug transactions.   
According to Moore, however, Niles subsequently decided to rob the victim 
instead.6 
Once in Myrtle Beach, the trio made several stops at various motels so that 
Niles could sell crack cocaine before meeting the victim at the designated meeting 
spot at approximately 7:00 p.m.  Hammond was driving Niles's rental vehicle, with 
Niles riding in the front passenger's seat and Moore riding in the back seat.  
Hammond parked the rental vehicle next to the victim's vehicle.  Moore testified 
that his role in the robbery was "to identify the weed" for Niles.  Therefore, Moore 
approached the victim's vehicle first.  Moore joined the victim in the victim's
vehicle, and the victim produced the bag of marijuana for Moore to inspect. 
Moore testified that as he returned to Niles's vehicle, Niles had already 
exited his vehicle, and Moore told Niles that the victim had the drugs.  Moore 
testified that as he returned to his place in Niles's vehicle, Niles was leaning inside 
the passenger-side door of the victim's vehicle and was speaking to the victim.7 
5 While Niles testified that he and the victim did not know each other personally, 
they had engaged in drug transactions for the past six to nine months.  Niles 
testified he knew the victim by his nickname, "Spice," and that the victim knew 
him by his nickname, "Rich Boy."  Niles testified that he and the victim were "in 
the business of selling drugs." 
6 Niles, on the other hand, testified that it was Moore's decision to rob the victim, 
and he did so without warning Niles beforehand. 
7 Niles's fingerprints were found on the victim's vehicle near where Niles was 
allegedly standing, corroborating Moore's testimony. 
12 

    
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                        
Moore testified he heard two shots and saw Niles leap into the back seat of 
his vehicle behind Hammond. 8  Moore then heard the victim fire a weapon in 
response. Niles and the victim shot back and forth multiple times.  Niles had the 
drugs with him that Niles had stolen from the victim.   
In contrast, Niles testified that Moore acted alone.  Niles stated he merely set 
up the meeting, but Moore went over to the victim's vehicle to purchase the drugs 
while Niles and Hammond sat in the car and discussed their upcoming wedding.  
Niles said he then saw Moore and the victim fighting in the victim's vehicle, and 
realized that Moore was robbing the victim.  Niles testified that Moore exited the 
victim's vehicle with the stolen drugs, and as Moore dove back into Niles's vehicle, 
Niles saw the victim draw his gun and shoot at them, knocking out the rear 
windows of Niles's vehicle.  Therefore, Niles grabbed his gun, and returned fire.  
According to Niles, he was concerned with stopping the shooter and for 
Hammond's safety:  
So, while he was shooting in the car . . . I grabbed my pistol and that's
when I shot two times. My eyes were closed. I wasn't even looking. I 
shot two times. I went pow, pow. I wasn't trying to hit nobody . . . I 
was just trying to get him to stop shooting. That's all I was trying to 
do. I didn't know if my fiancé got shot or nothing. That's the first thing 
that came to my head, you know. 
After the shooting, Niles instructed Hammond to drive away from the scene, 
and the trio abandoned the vehicle at a nearby trailer park.  Niles then called a 
taxicab to transport him and Hammond to a local motel.  At that point, he and 
Hammond parted ways with Moore, and Moore kept the marijuana.  The victim
died at the scene from a gunshot wound. 
On these facts, the trial court instructed the jury on the law of murder and 
self-defense, but refused Niles's request to instruct the jury on voluntary 
manslaughter, reasoning that the evidence showed Niles was either guilty of 
murder or he was not guilty of any crime based on his claim of self-defense. 
8 Other witnesses to the shooting testified that they saw a "heavyset" black male 
running from the victim's car back to a dark sedan, which the State argued closely 
matched Niles's description, as Moore had a much smaller build than Niles. 
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The court of appeals reversed Niles's murder conviction and remanded the 
case for a new trial, finding the evidence compelled a jury instruction on the lesser-
included offense of voluntary manslaughter.  Niles, 400 S.C. at 534, 735 S.E.2d at 
244. Specifically, the court of appeals found there was evidence of sufficient legal 
provocation based on Niles's testimony that he shot at the victim only after the 
victim began shooting first. Id. at 535, 735 S.E.2d at 244. Further, the court of 
appeals found that there was evidence that Niles acted in a sudden heat of passion 
based on Niles's testimony that he took Moore to meet the victim to buy marijuana; 
that Moore, without warning, decided to rob the victim; and that Niles did not fire 
his gun until after Moore perpetrated the robbery and the victim shot first.  Id. at
536, 735 S.E.2d at 245. Therefore, the court of appeals concluded that there was 
evidence that Niles did not have an opportunity for cool reflection, and as such, 
there was evidence Niles acted in a sudden heat of passion.   Id.
We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to consider the State's 
argument that the court of appeals erred in determining Niles was entitled to a jury 
instruction on voluntary manslaughter because there was no evidence at trial that 
Niles acted in the sudden heat of passion.9 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only.  State 
v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006).  Thus, this Court is bound 
by the trial court's factual findings unless the appellant can demonstrate that the 
trial court's conclusions either lack evidentiary support or are controlled by an error 
of law. State v. Laney, 367 S.C. 639, 644, 627 S.E.2d 726, 729 (2006).  "The 
refusal to grant a requested jury charge that states a sound principle of law 
applicable to the case at hand is an error of law."  State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 
570, 647 S.E.2d 144, 167 (2007). 
ANALYSIS
The State maintains the trial court did not err in refusing Niles's request for 
an instruction on voluntary manslaughter because Niles failed to present evidence 
that he acted in the sudden heat of passion.  We agree with the State that there was 
9 We note that the State has not challenged the court of appeals' finding that there 
was evidence of sufficient legal provocation. 
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no evidence that Niles acted within a sudden heat of passion upon sufficient legal 
provocation, and therefore the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury 
on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter.
"The law to be charged to the jury is determined by the evidence presented 
at trial." State v. Hill, 315 S.C. 260, 262, 433 S.E.2d 848, 849 (1993).  The trial 
court is required to charge a jury on a lesser-included offense if there is evidence 
from which it could be inferred that the defendant committed the lesser, rather than 
the greater, offense.  State v. Drafts, 288 S.C. 30, 340 S.E.2d 784 (1986); Dempsey
v. State, 363 S.C. 365, 610 S.E.2d 812 (2005).  When determining whether the 
evidence requires a charge on voluntary manslaughter, the court must view the 
facts in the light most favorable to the defendant.  Pittman, 373 S.C. at 572–73, 
647 S.E.2d at 168. 
"Voluntary manslaughter is the intentional and unlawful killing of a human
being in sudden heat of passion upon sufficient legal provocation."  State v. Smith, 
391 S.C. 408, 412–13, 706 S.E.2d 12, 14 (2011). To receive a voluntary 
manslaughter charge, there must be evidence of sufficient legal provocation and 
sudden heat of passion. State v. Cole, 338 S.C. 97, 101, 525 S.E.2d 511, 513 
(2000). 
The sudden heat of passion, upon sufficient legal provocation, which 
mitigates a felonious killing to manslaughter, while it need not dethrone 
reason entirely, or shut out knowledge and volition, must be such as would 
naturally disturb the sway of reason, and render the mind of an ordinary 
person incapable of cool reflection, and produce what, according to human 
experience, may be called an uncontrollable impulse to do violence.  
State v. Walker, 324 S.C. 257, 260, 478 S.E.2d 280, 281 (1996).  Whether or not 
the facts constitute a sudden heat of passion is an appropriate question for the 
court. State v. Hernandez, 386 S.C. 655, 662, 690 S.E.2d 582, 586 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(citation omitted).
Niles's own testimony does not establish that he was overtaken by a sudden 
heat of passion such that he had an uncontrollable impulse to do violence. Rather, 
Niles testified that he did not want to hurt the victim; that he shot with his eyes 
closed; that he was merely attempting to stop the victim from shooting; and that 
when he shot his gun, he was thinking of Hammond rather than of perpetrating 
15 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
 
violence upon the victim.  See Cole, 338 S.C. at 102, 525 S.E.2d at 513 ("[T]here 
was no evidence presented that Appellant was overcome by a sudden heat of 
passion as would produce an 'uncontrollable impulse to do violence.' On the 
contrary, by Appellant's own testimony, he shot at the men to scare them away. 
Appellant's testimony appears designed to support a charge of self[-]defense, not  
heat of passion."). As in Cole, the focus of Niles's testimony at trial was on who 
was the aggressor—Niles or the victim—apparently to support Niles's theory of 
self-defense. In State v. Childers, we explained: 
Voluntary manslaughter, by definition, requires a criminal intent to do 
harm to another. But according to the defendant's story, he had no 
criminal intent whatsoever. 
If, as he suggests, the defendant returned fire in a panic for his 
life, surely the defense of self-defense would be appropriate. Notably, 
this was charged by the trial court . . . . Without any evidence 
supporting the view that the defendant fired the fatal shots while 
under an "uncontrollable impulse to do violence," the trial court 
properly declined to charge the law of voluntary manslaughter to the 
jury.
373 S.C. 367, 375–76, 645 S.E.2d 233, 237 (2007).  Because Niles, by his own 
testimony, lacked the intent to harm the victim, we cannot see how a voluntary 
manslaughter charge would have been appropriate under these facts.10 
We note further that it was undisputed that Niles, Hammond, and Moore met 
the victim in the parking to rob the victim during the drug transaction.11  Niles 
10 Undeniably, murder, self-defense, and voluntary manslaughter may coexist 
under the right factual circumstances; here, however, Niles's testimony went to the 
elements of self-defense, not voluntary manslaughter. 
11 There was conflicting testimony regarding whose idea it was to rob the victim 
and who in fact robbed the victim. However, it is undisputed that an armed 
robbery occurred, of which all were found guilty.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 16-11­
330(A) (Supp. 2013) (providing that any person who commits robbery while 
armed with a pistol or other deadly weapon is guilty of armed robbery).  
Importantly, Niles has not appealed his conviction.  Thus, even viewing the facts in 
16 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
further admitted that Moore and Hammond were unarmed, and that he fired the 
fatal shots, killing the victim. Thus, the scheme to rob the victim, coupled with 
Niles's decision to arrive at the scene armed with a deadly weapon, discounts any 
claim that Niles in any way act in a sudden heat of passion.  Rather, Niles clearly 
planned for the possibility that he might have to discharge his weapon to 
accomplish the robbery, and did in fact kill the victim.  These salient facts cannot 
be ignored. See Pittman, 373 S.C. at 575, 647 S.E.2d at 169 ("In determining 
whether an act which caused death was impelled by heat of passion or by malice, 
all the surrounding circumstances and conditions are to be taken into consideration,
including previous relations and conditions connected with the tragedy, as well as 
those existing at the time of the killing." (citation omitted)).  In other words, there 
was nothing sudden about Niles's decision to shoot the victim.12 
Thus, we hold that the evidence did not warrant a voluntary manslaughter 
charge. See State v. Smith, 315 S.C. 547, 549, 446 S.E.2d 411, 412–13 (1994) 
("The trial court may and should refuse to charge on a lesser-included offense 
where there is no evidence that the defendant committed the lesser rather than the 
greater offense."). 
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the court of appeals. 
REVERSED.
BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur.  PLEICONES, J., 
dissenting in a separate opinion. 
a light most favorable to Niles, we may presume that Niles actively participated in 
perpetrating the armed robbery.
12 Along the same lines, while the State has not challenged the court of appeals' 
findings with respect to sufficient legal provocation, we note that sufficient legal 
provocation cannot be found to exist where the victim is defending himself from a 
crime.  See State v. Knoten, 347 S.C. 296, 314, 555 S.E.2d 391, 400 (2001) 
(Burnett, J., dissenting) ("A victim's attempts to resist or defend herself from a 
crime cannot satisfy the sufficient legal provocation element of voluntary 
manslaughter." (citing State v. Shuler, 344 S.C. 604, 545 S.E.2d 805 (2001)). 
17 

  
JUSTICE PLEICONES: I respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the court of 
appeals was correct in its holding that there is evidence in the record entitling Niles 
to a charge on voluntary manslaughter.  
If there is any evidence to support a jury charge, the trial judge should grant the 
request. State v. Shuler, 344 S.C. 604, 632, 545 S.E.2d 805, 819 (2001). “To 
warrant the court in eliminating the offense of manslaughter it should very clearly 
appear that there is no evidence whatsoever tending to reduce the crime from 
murder to manslaughter.” State v. Wharton, 381 S.C. 209, 214, 672 S.E.2d 786, 
788 (2009). Voluntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being in 
sudden heat of passion upon sufficient legal provocation. State v. Smith, 391 S.C. 
408, 412-413, 706 S.E.2d 12, 14 (2011).  The sudden heat of passion needed to 
justify a voluntary manslaughter charge must be such as would naturally disturb 
the sway of reason and render the mind of an ordinary person incapable of cool 
reflection and produce what may be called an uncontrollable impulse to do 
violence. State v. Cole, 338 S.C. 97, 101-102, 525 S.E.2d 511, 513 (2000). 
In this case, a voluntary manslaughter charge should have been given if there were 
any evidence in the record from which a jury could infer that this killing was the 
result of sufficient legal provocation which caused Niles to experience an 
uncontrollable impulse to do violence. In my opinion, there is. 
 First, as the court of appeals noted, the unprovoked shooting by Salter amounted 
to evidence sufficient for a jury to infer that there was legal provocation. See State 
v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 573, 647 S.E.2d 144, 168 (2008) ("This court has 
previously held than an overt, threatening act or a physical encounter may 
constitute sufficient legal provocation."). Second, I agree with the court of appeals 
that Niles's testimony that he immediately returned fire out of fear for himself and 
his fiancée provided evidence from which a jury could find that Niles was acting 
pursuant to an uncontrollable impulse to do violence. State v. Wiggins, 330 S.C. 
538, 549, 500 S.E.2d 489, 495 (1998) (holding that the lower court properly 
charged the jury on voluntary manslaughter where defendant testified he was in 
fear of the threat of physical assault). Accordingly, I would affirm the court of 
appeals because I cannot say there is no evidence whatsoever tending to reduce this 
crime from murder to manslaughter. 
Unlike the majority, I am unable to discern Niles' intent and state of mind on April 
9, 2007, and to resolve numerous factual issues much as a jury might have done.  
For example, the majority states with certitude that Niles determined "to arrive at 
18 

  
 
 
the scene armed with a deadly weapon," thus demonstrating he "clearly planned for 
the possibility that he might have to discharge his weapon to accomplish the 
robbery . . . ." In light of this premeditated decision, the majority states "there was 
nothing sudden about Niles' decision to shoot the victim."  In my opinion, the 
majority exceeds our scope of review in this law case by resolving disputed issues 
of fact in order to deny Niles a new trial. E.g., State v. Sams, 410 S.C. 303, 764 
S.E.2d 511 (2014).
I would affirm the court of appeals. 
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PER CURIAM: We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' 
decision in State v. Lewis, 403 S.C. 345, 743 S.E.2d 124 (Ct. App. 2013). We now
dismiss the writ as improvidently granted. 
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., 
concur. 
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KONDUROS, J.:  Sidney Patten appeals the family court's order finding him a 
vulnerable adult under the Omnibus Adult Protection Act, sections 43-35-5 to -595 
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of the South Carolina Code (2015 & Supp. 2014) (the Act).  We reverse and 
remand. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
At the time of his hearing, Patten was sixty-three years old and in reasonably good 
physical health. The record reflects he moved slowly, took blood pressure 
medication, used eye drops, and may have taken medication for anxiety.  Patten 
came to the Department of Social Services' (DSS) attention in Rock Hill based on 
allegations relating to his living conditions and reports he was dirty and had called 
911 numerous times claiming persons were damaging his home or property.1 
According to the record, Patten was living in a home with no running water or 
electricity and cluttered with various items.  Although the record contains little 
direct information about the exterior of the house, it appears the yard contained an 
extensive amount of debris and clutter as well.  Additionally, the kitchen ceiling 
had a hole in it from a kitchen fire at some point in the past.2  Martha Jones was
assigned as Patten's DSS caseworker and testified at the final hearing.  According 
to Jones, when she visited Patten in his home in December, she did not think his 
condition or living conditions warranted his being placed in protective custody 
although the situation was not ideal.  Jones returned to the home in January and 
observed Patten had not made any changes to his living conditions.   
Simultaneously with the DSS investigation, Patten was involved with the City of 
Rock Hill's Environmental Court.3  Patten indicated he had not corrected issues 
with the house because he did not have the money to make the required repairs to 
get a city permit and have water and electrical services restored.  Patten received 
$782 per month in social security disability.  He did not pay to live in the home as 
it was apparently family property belonging to him and other relatives who make 
no claim to the dilapidated residence.   
1 The record contains no evidence regarding the alleged 911 calls or whether others 

were damaging Patten's home or property. 

2 The size and severity of the "hole" is unclear from the record other than a social 

worker's testimony you could see light through it.   

3 Environmental Court is a division of municipal court addressing owners'
 
maintenance of their property.   
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Patten was using propane tanks at times to heat the home and warm food, and he 
had bottles of water and a bucket functioning as his bathroom.  Floretta Anderson, 
a social worker with the Environmental Court, testified that the day she visited 
Patten, his home was freezing and she was concerned about the condition of the 
home. As a result, she alerted city authorities and persuaded Patten to go with the 
police to have his health evaluated. After an emergency hearing, the family court 
determined Patten was a vulnerable adult and should remain in DSS protective 
custody.
Jones continued seeing Patten once he was in DSS custody.  She testified Patten 
had a psychological evaluation that was inconclusive.  She also provided Patten 
was more stable at the time of the hearing than during some of their previous visits 
during which he was often upset about his placement in DSS custody.  She further 
indicated Patten was capable of getting food and medicine and getting to where he 
needed to go. 
Patten's testimony at the final hearing reflected he was not coherent on some 
subjects and got confused. He did not have a clear plan regarding where he would 
live if his home was condemned and had no specific plan on how to make the 
repairs required by the City.   
The family court determined DSS presented "evidence of a non-medical nature 
which substantiates the vulnerability of Mr. Patten."  The family court stated 
"[e]vidence was presented which showed that Mr. Patten is confused at times 
regarding his marital status, regarding his family members and regarding his 
abilities to correct his living situation on his own.  His own testimony was at times 
confused and rambling."  The order further indicates "[t]he evidence is clear that 
Mr. Patten, when allowed to attempt to provide for himself is unable to do so in a 
safe manner." Consequently, the family court ordered Patten to remain in DSS 
custody. This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"In appeals from the family court, the appellate court reviews factual and legal 
issues de novo. De novo review permits appellate court fact-finding, 
notwithstanding the presence of evidence supporting the [family] court's findings."  
Doe v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 407 S.C. 623, 632, 757 S.E.2d 712, 716-17 (2014) 
(alteration by court) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  "However, we 
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recognize this broad scope of review does not alter the fact that a family court is 
better able to make credibility determinations because it has the opportunity to 
observe the witnesses." Id. at 632, 757 S.E.2d at 717 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
LAW/ANALYSIS 
Patten argues the family court erred in finding he was a vulnerable adult.  We 
agree. 
The recent case of Doe v. South Carolina Department of Social Services, 407 S.C. 
623, 757 S.E.2d 712 (2014), controls the disposition of this case as it sets forth the 
requisite analysis for determining if someone is a vulnerable adult within the 
meaning of the Act.4 
The Act defines a vulnerable adult as follows: 
[A] person eighteen years of age or older who has a 
physical or mental condition which substantially impairs 
the person from adequately providing for his or her own 
care or protection. This includes a person who is 
impaired in the ability to adequately provide for the 
person's own care or protection because of the infirmities 
of aging including, but not limited to, organic brain 
damage, advanced age, and physical, mental, or 
emotional dysfunction.  A resident of a facility is a 
vulnerable adult. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 43-35-10(11) (2015).
"By its clear terms, the infirmities of aging must 'substantially impair' the person's 
ability to adequately provide for his or her own care or protection."  Doe, 407 S.C. 
at 634, 757 S.E.2d at 718. "[F]or a person to be deemed a vulnerable adult under 
the Act[,] the person's physical or mental condition, including advanced age, must 
cause a diminished ability to adequately provide for self-care or protection."  Id. at
4 We note the learned family court judge and trial counsel did not have the benefit 
of the Doe case as it was decided after Patten's hearing. 
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635, 757 S.E.2d at 718. "Without question, an involuntary removal under the Act 
deprives a person of his liberty as well as property if the court orders a vulnerable 
adult to pay for the care received while in the custody of DSS."  Id. at 637, 757 
S.E.2d at 719. "Accordingly, . . . a heightened standard of proof, i.e., clear and 
convincing evidence, is necessary under these circumstances."  Id. 
[P]overty or the lack of adequate funds or resources may 
have a deleterious effect on an individual's ability to 
adequately provide for her care and protection; however, 
poverty alone is not sufficient to satisfy the definition of 
a vulnerable adult under the Act.  Rather, there must be 
evidence of other factors that cause the deleterious effect.  
Id. at 638 n.16, 757 S.E.2d at 720 n.16.
Doe was an eighty-six-year-old woman with a heart condition.  Id. at 627, 757 
S.E.2d at 714. She lived alone without family support.  Id. Deputies who arrived 
to investigate an allegation regarding her living conditions observed the home was 
"in an unsanitary and deplorable condition." Id. at 627-28, 757 S.E.2d at 714. 
They noted a hole in the roof and a hose running from a neighbor's home to 
provide water.  Id. at 628, 757 S.E.2d at 714. They observed "mold on the window 
curtains and piles of items on the floor giving the appearance that Doe was a 
'hoarder.'"  Id. After her removal, Doe was evaluated by Dr. Marc Harari, a 
licensed counseling psychologist.  Id. at 629, 757 S.E.2d at 715.  He concluded 
"Doe appeared to have 'the minimum levels of competency to function 
independently' as there was no evidence of dementia, severe emotional issues, or 
obvious physical limitations."5 Id. at 630, 757 S.E.2d at 715. When asked about 
repairing her home, Doe testified the hole in the roof had been repaired and her 
water had been turned off over a disputed bill.  Id. at 631, 757 S.E.2d at 716. She 
indicated she had paid the bill and could request to have the water turned back on.  
Id. The family court concluded Doe met the statutory definition of a vulnerable 
adult under the Act.6 Id. In reversing that decision, the supreme court focused on 
5 Dr. Harari also recommended DSS maintain an open treatment case to ensure 
Doe's home was repaired and that she interact with peers to alleviate feelings of
isolation. Id. 
6 The family court determined Doe would continue in DSS protective custody until 
(1) her water supply was reconnected; (2) the house was clean; (3) electrical power 
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the lack of a causal relationship between Doe's living conditions and any mental or 
physical limitation. 
Significantly, counsel for DSS admitted the evidence was 
"scant" and there was only a "scintilla of evidence" to 
show that Doe qualified as a vulnerable adult under the 
terms of the Act.  Furthermore, there is no evidence that 
Doe's advanced age substantially impaired her ability to 
adequately provide for her own care and protection.  
Specifically, there is no evidence of physical or mental 
infirmities that would prohibit Doe from living 
independently. To the contrary, the evaluating 
psychologist concluded Doe possessed a level of 
competency sufficient for her to function independently 
and she had no obvious physical limitations.  Moreover, 
there is no evidence the unfavorable home condition that 
precipitated Doe's involuntary removal was causally 
related to her advanced age.  Instead, the problems with 
Doe's home were dependent on the finances needed to 
repair the roof and turn on the water supply. Although 
there is some evidence that Doe's home was in disarray, 
DSS offered no evidence attributing the lack of 
cleanliness to a deficiency in Doe's mental or physical 
condition. Accordingly, we find the family court erred in 
classifying Doe as a vulnerable adult. 
Id. at 638, 757 S.E.2d at 719-20 (footnote omitted). 
Using the framework set forth in Doe, we conclude DSS failed to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence Patten was a vulnerable adult under the Act.  First, 
Patten's psychological evaluation was inconclusive and no information regarding 
the evaluation was presented to the family court or included in the record on 
appeal. Additionally, Patten had been able to sustain himself in relatively good 
health in the home even though the home was not in a condition that most people 
was supplied to the home; (4) the heating system was operational; (5) an air 
conditioning system, if in place, was operational; and (6) the house had adequate 
food and cleaning supplies. Id. at 631-32, 757 S.E.2d at 716. 
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would find suitable. The record demonstrates he eats well, including sometimes 
visiting the local soup kitchen; obtains his medications; attends a local church; and 
is generally able to get where he wants to go, either on foot or by other means.  
Therefore, we reverse the family court's determination Patten was a vulnerable 
adult. 
We are mindful circumstances may have changed during the pendency of this 
appeal. Remand is needed, as in Doe, for DSS to inform the family court of the 
current status of Patten's health, home, and finances and to determine what 
additional community services he may be entitled to in light of his return to the 
community.  The review hearing should be conducted in a manner consistent with 
this opinion and as expeditiously as possible so Patten does not spend any more 
time in custody than absolutely necessary. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
THOMAS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur. 
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